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Abstraction and Economic Analysis 
 
  Economic theory, of necessity, presents an 
abstraction to the reader.  Abstraction is required to 
achieve the perspective that allows for theory, that is 
to say, understanding and interpretation, to occur.  If 
the abstraction is done well only inessential details are 
set aside -- details that would otherwise divert the 
theorist from grasping the essential or fundamental 
elements of the process under examination.  For example a 
study of the mechanisms that cause a moving automobile to 
stop can reasonably abstract from the vehicle's color 
scheme. 
  For this process to be valid it is critical that the 
theorist distinguish between "simplifying" and 
"substantive" assumptions.  The former clears away the 
inessential.  The latter elevates or prioritizes the 
inessential -- thereby contributing to a distorted 
understanding.  The difficulty is that distinguishing 
between simplifying and substantial assumptions remains, 
and will always remain, something of an art.  Fifty years 
ago the siren of "Positive Economics" proposed that this 
critical distinction could be reliably made by adhering 
to a set of clear and simple rules.  While some   4
economists and empirical psychologists maintain a 
nostalgic commitment to that eclipsed understanding of 
science, today most thinking practitioners are aware that 
such an epistemological stance, with its triumphant 
dismissal of the need for defensible assumptions, was 
naive -- even misguided. 
  Out of this epistemological vacuum economists have 
retreated to several crude "fixes" to guide their 
selection of abstractions.  Occasional assertions to the 
contrary, these methods are conventions.  Innocent of any 
knowledge of these issues, many economists instinctively 
deploy the abstractions used by their graduate advisor, 
or rely on those that most frequently appear in what are 
held to be the profession's premier journals.  Economics, 
perhaps more than ever, is now defined by what economists 
do. 
  Ideally, the distinction between substantive and 
simplifying assumptions could be grounded in something 
more meaningful.  Such a ground does exist -- it is 
called judgment.  Unfortunately judgment, like "beauty" 
or "goodness," is difficult to define without invoking 
specific cases.  The reason is that good judgment 
requires a sense of context.  Context is most readily 
gained through direct experience, a study of history, or 
the comparative method.  Once acquired, this knowledge 
enables the researcher to "compare and contrast" one 
situation with another, to learn from previous efforts to   5
interpret the subject at hand, or to benefit from 
multiple approaches to a single question. 
  In short, judgment requires the kind of broad-
ranging knowledge that is largely absent, even disdained, 
in the training of the economists of our era ("training" 
is the appropriate term in this context -- to be 
contrasted with "education").  To appreciate the 
implications and importance of the distinction between 
"simplifying" and "substantive" assumptions, consider the 
conventional assumption of "Free Entry and Exit." 
 
 
The "Free Entry and Exit" Assumption and the Implicit 
Denial of Bargaining Power 
 
  Free entry and exit is almost always presented as a 
"simplifying" assumption.  Several generations of 
economics textbooks have repeatedly asserted that its 
value is in enabling students and researchers to grasp 
the essence of the market process by freeing them from 
the inessential distractions inherent in the particulars 
of time and place. 
  But is this assumption really an innocent 
simplification?  Among the "inessential distractions" it 
abstracts from is bargaining power.  For some markets, 
such as that for a slice of pizza in New York City, or an 
espresso coffee in the heart of Paris, we can confidently   6
ignore issues related to bargaining power.  However, in 
most cases understanding the cause, extent, and 
implications of bargaining power is essential to a 
coherent theory of market dynamics.  Stated simply, those 
with superior bargaining power enjoy a disproportionate 
influence over the price and ancillary conditions of the 
exchange (these latter include the time and place of the 
exchange, terms of delivery, means of payment, guarantees 
of quality, etc). 
  In its most elementary conception, bargaining power 
can be reduced to the relative ability of each party to 
an exchange to "walk away" (Prasch 1995).  Free entry and 
exit simply finesses such considerations by positing that 
all parties to an exchange are absolutely equal, in the 
sense that they are free to enter and exit the market at 
no cost to themselves.  In this manner relative 
bargaining power is removed from consideration.  For many 
if not most markets and market phenomena, removing 
considerations of bargaining power represents a 
substantive rather than a simplifying assumption. 
  One reason that bargaining power is invisible to so 
many economists is that they have been taught, and 
instinctively draw upon, a uniquely limited understanding 
of coercion.  This vision presumes that only physical 
force or the state's mandates can be coercive once the 
institutions of private property and "free" markets have 
been widely established.  The proposition that private   7
economic power exists, or could have important or lasting 




Property and Coercion 
 
  Institutionalists have long argued that such a 
perspective on coercion is as naive as it is erroneous.  
Among other objections, they have argued that private 
property is itself, by design and intent, coercive.  
Indeed the point, as opposed to an accidental effect, of 
property law is for the state to grant and protect a 
right of exclusive disposal over some object, service, or 
privilege to a particular person or entity. 
  For illustration, consider a situation in which some 
people have neither savings nor a source of income and 
all objects, services, and privileges (hereafter 
collectively termed "goods"), are privately owned.  No 
goods, not even the roads or parks, are held in common.  
In such a case, property-less persons can do nothing, 
including meet their most basic survival needs, without 
first receiving, after agreeing to terms, means of 
payment from some property owner.  This will, in most 
instances, require providing some service in return.  
Should this requirement be ignored, its violator is 
subject to arrest by the state's officers for trespass or   8
theft.  Thus, in the absence of a commons, each of us 
must already own the goods we need, or come to terms with 
someone if we are not to perish.  This condition 
represents, almost trivially, a form of sovereignty 
(Cohen 1978). 
  In every short period it is evident that for most of 
us private property places limits on our ability to have, 
to do, and to be.  For survival, to say nothing of 
achieving our several ends in life, those without wealth 
must first come to terms with an owner of property to 
acquire means of payment.  By contrast to feudalism, the 
propertyless are formally "free" in the sense that the 
persons with whom they must negotiate are not identified 
by previously existing social arrangements.  Moreover 
those persons with whom the propertyless must bargain to 
obtain means of payment may be in varying degrees of 
competition with each other.  Nevertheless, the principle 
that some autonomy must be surrendered remains.  What is 
unknown and remains to be determined are the precise 
conditions and terms. 
  Now most social theorists agree, as an abstract 
proposition, that just and justly applied laws of 
property promote a greater good for one and all even if   9
they diminish our ability to do certain things at any 
given moment in time.1 
 
To protect a consumer's liberty from 
annihilation at the hands of other consumers, 
the law curtails it in a more methodical and 
less drastic way, by forbidding the use of goods 
without the consent of the owner.  In practice 
this means that the liberty to consume is 
conditioned on the payment of the market price 
(Hale 1943, 626). 
 
  Since our ability to consume is conditioned on our 
access to means of payment, it follows that the laws of 
property are differently experienced according to our 
wealth.  To a person of substantial wealth, a world where 
everything is private property presents itself as one 
where they are, as the neoclassical economists like to 
say, "free to choose."  If one's wealth is great enough, 
and the persons with whom one is interacting in a given 
market have limited opportunities and substantial unmet 
needs, such a regime can become one of license.  
Instances of great social dislocation, such as those of a 
                      
1What constitutes "just and justly applied" laws of 
property is, of course, the interesting and lasting 
issue.   10
famine, reveal an endless number of striking examples to 
illustrate this point.  When our freedom -- that is to 
say our relative ability to have, to do, and to be -- 
depends upon wealth, then those who enjoy substantial 
wealth also enjoy a greater degree of freedom. 
  To a person without access to means of payment, a 
world where everything is private property presents a 
strikingly different picture.  If all goods, including 
necessities, are rationed by income they will have access 
to very little.2  As such, the impecunious person's day-
to-day experience will be one of continuous adaptation to 
constraints and prohibitions.  Their "freedom to choose," 
while formally protected by law, is effectively nullified 
in practice. 
 
The employer's power to induce people to work 
for him depends largely on the fact that the law 
previously restricts the liberty of these people 
to consume, while he has the power, through the 
payment of wages, to release them to some extent 
                      
2Economists present a false dichotomy when they contrast 
"markets" with "rationing."  Markets, it should be 
obvious, ration goods according to the ability and 
willingness to spend.  While this is different from 
rationing according to need, political influence, or 
priority in line, it remains a form of rationing.   11
from these restrictions.  He has little power 
over those whose freedom to consume is 
relatively unrestricted, because they have large 
independent means, or who can secure freedom to 
consume from other employers, because of their 
ability to render services of a sort that is 
scarce and in great demand (Hale 1943, 627). 
 
  If propertyless individuals cannot sell their labor 
or even their persons for a price greater than the cost 
of their needs, then the restrictions inherent in a pure 
private property regime are a cause of distress, even 
death, unless some form of extra-market subsistence is 
extended in a timely manner.  That this is not a 
speculative result was affirmed by the great famines of 
nineteenth century Ireland and India.  In each instance 
British colonial officials depended upon the free market 
to feed masses of starving people who had nothing to 
sell.  Predictably, tens of millions died.  Again, it 
must be emphasized that the British Empire, as part of 
its "civilizing mission," guaranteed that every one of 
the millions of people who died had an absolute right to 
purchase food -- all they lacked was the means to do so. 
  The extreme example of famine affirms that in an 
unregulated market individual property owners, backed by 
the full authority of the state, may set the conditions 
and terms by which others may acquire ownership or use of   12
their goods.  Of course, the terms that owners may demand 
for the use of their property is moderated by the 
specific qualities of the goods in question and the 
degree of competition in the market.  These conditions 
may, or may not, represent an adequate check on their 
bargaining power.  It certainly does not do so if the 
population is starving and mainstream economists are able 
to convince themselves and the authorities that everyone 
will be fine in their favored period: The Long Run.  
Unfortunately, history has repeatedly demonstrated that 
needy persons may have to surrender their dignity, their 
children, and even their lives while they await the 
arrival of this legendary non-period. 
  Today, the coercive aspect of property becomes most 
evident when a good that was formally part of the commons 
is privatized.  Suddenly confronted with a demand for 
payment to continue in a course of action that was 
previously free, the coercive nature of property becomes 
transparent and is resisted.  Prominent examples include 
the recording industry's strenuous efforts to prevent the 
sharing of recorded music among young Americans, or the 
ending of free access to potable water in those 
unfortunate Third World cities that have been unable to 
stave off the World Bank's privatization mandates. 
 
 
The Contours of Bargaining Power   13
 
  As we have seen the coercive aspect of private 
property conditions, and at times limits, people's 
ability to meet their needs.  It follows that an analysis 
that begins by assuming free entry and exit may be an 
inadequate ground for understanding the system of 
exchange conventionally termed a "market society" if 
property and bargaining power are unevenly distributed -- 
as is generally the case. 
  My right to what is designated my private property, 
from a legal and economic standpoint, empowers me to deny 
you access to my goods unless you can induce me to change 
my mind.  "This power of property in itself, the power to 
withhold, seen in these extreme cases, is but an 
enlargement of that power which exists in all property as 
the source of value-in-exchange and which may be 
distinguished as waiting-power, the power to hold back 
until the opposite party consents to the bargain (Commons 
1924, 54, italics in the original).  In a market system, 
consent is most reliably achieved through the provision 
of a payment.  In a property-based market society the 
issue is not the principle, but rather the size, of this 
payment.  This, in turn, is determined by our bargaining 
power. 
  To understand the place of property in the formation 
of relative bargaining power it is essential to know the 
context.  Considerations will include the specific   14
qualities of the good, the unmet needs of each party to 
the exchange, and the structure of the market.  Do you 
"need" or do you "want" the particular goods that I 
possess?  Do you have access to acceptable alternatives?  
Are you categorically unable to access certain markets or 
large segments of these markets?  How viable, then, are 
your options?  What are the transaction and direct costs 
of these options?  The answer to each of these questions 
determines your capacity to "walk away" from any given 
exchange.  If it is the case that I will suffer a greater 
loss than you in the event that we fail to consummate a 
given exchange, then your greater ability to walk away 
enables you to effectively demand a lower price or more 
favorable terms from me (Prasch 1995; 1999; Levine 1988, 
Ch. 1). 
  It is now evident that the "Free entry and exit" 
assumption presupposes that the good in question: (1) Is 
not a necessity. (2) Has many perfect or near-perfect 
substitutes.  (3) Can be acquired with negligible 
transaction and direct costs.  Each of these conditions 
implies that one can readily get along without achieving 
any specific exchange.  This last proposition implies 
that a failure to agree to an exchange at a reasonable 
price will leave each party in a condition identical to 
the one in which they initially entered the market. 
  Let us return to the above example of pizza.  Few 
New Yorkers really "need" a slice of pizza from any   15
specific vendor.  While it may contribute to their 
overall happiness, it is likely that they would soon 
recover if they failed to acquire a specific slice of 
pizza from a specific vendor at a reasonable price.  
Throughout New York City pizza is available from numerous 
competing venders and the "transaction cost" of going 
from one to another is not, typically, prohibitive.  Such 
a commodity, we can surmise, is not a necessity, is 
relatively inexpensive, and features a variety of 
acceptable substitutes and near-substitutes -- such as a 
falafel or a hot dog.  It follows that one may plausibly 
consider the market for a slice of pizza in New York City 
to be characterized by free entry and exit.  But can 
these qualities be said to hold for electricity?  The 
market for home loans, or what is dubiously labeled 
"executive talent"? 
  Bargaining power, by contrast to the conventional 
presentations of economic theory, is an important 
consideration in a wide variety of markets.  Yet assuming 
free entry and exit remains the pedagogical and research 
norm.  Too often this substantive assumption is made 
under the guise of simplifying the analysis.  
Unfortunately this substantive assumption has had a 
lasting impact on what passes for our "understanding" of 
many markets.  This error, in turn, has implications for 
the boundaries between what are considered "acceptable," 
"unacceptable,"  and "irresponsible" policies.  In short,   16
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